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Reconciling Justice and Pleasure in  
Epicurean Contractarianism 
John Thrasher 
University of Arizona 
Johnthrasher23@gmail.com 
Abstract: Epicurean contractarianism is an attempt to reconcile individualistic hedonism with a 
robust account of justice. The pursuit of pleasure and the requirements of justice, however, have 
seemed to be incompatible to many commentators, both ancient and modern. It is not clear how it 
is possible to reconcile hedonism with the demands of justice. Furthermore, it is not clear why, 
even if Epicurean contractarianism is possible, why it would be necessary for Epicureans to 
endorse a social contract. I argue here that Epicurean contractarianism is both possible and 
necessary once we understand Epicurean practical rationality in a new way. We are left with an 
appealing version of teleological, individualistic contractarianism that is significantly different 
from Hobbesian contractarianism.    
Keywords: Epicurus, Social Contract, Lucretius, Mixed-Motive Games, Stag 
Hunt,  
1. The Epicurean Reconciliation Project 
Epicurean contract theory represents a unique and important tradition in both the 
history of the social contract and western political thought generally. Although 
not well known among political and moral theorists, it is significantly different 
from what Jean Hampton has called the two, Kantian and Hobbesian, faces of 
contract theory (Hampton 1991). Epicurean contract theory is unique in its 
attempt to reconcile the individual’s pursuit of pleasure and tranquility with the 
public need for justice and peace.  
This Epicurean “reconciliation project” is distinguished from the 
Hobbesian project of reconciling private prudence with public morality in several 
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instructive ways. 1  Justice, for the Epicurean, secures the natural need for 
tranquility and happiness (KD 31).2 While the Epicurean has a positive goal for 
contracting, the Hobbesian has an essentially negative goal for entering 
contractual society. The Hobbesian sees the social contract as a way to end the 
war of all against all in the state of nature (Hampton 1988, chap. 2).  The 
Epicurean is motivated to enter contractual society in order to secure happiness 
and cooperation, whereas the Hobbesian seeks to avoid war. Furthermore, it is 
fear, particularly the fear of violent death, which motivates the Hobbesian. 
Without this fear, the Hobbesian would not be motivated to seek or maintain the 
social contract. The Epicurean, however, aims to eliminate the fear of death in 
order to achieve tranquility and peace (Mitsis 1988, p. 67).  These differences 
make the Epicurean social contract distinct in interesting ways from its Hobbesian 
cousin. Epicurean contractarianism is a non-Hobbesian teleological account of 
justice. Those who are attracted to teleological theories of practical rationality and 
contractual theories of justice will find Epicurean contractarianism appealing.    
This version of contractarianism is also interesting because it was so 
unusual. Among the major ancient philosophers, the idea of the social contract 
was often used as a example of a “a pernicious error” to be attacked (Vlastos 
1941, p. 291).  Indeed, according to Gough, “much of the political philosophy of 
                                               
1 Here I am drawing on Gregory Kavka’s “reconciliation project.” See: (Kavka 1984; Kavka 
1986). 
2 In the following pages KD refers to Kuria Doxa or Principle Doctrines, VS refers to Vatican 
Sayings, and Ep. Men. refers to the Letter to Menoeceus. All references are from The Epicurus 
Reader translation by Inwood and Gerson. See: (Inwood and Gerson 1994).  
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Plato and Aristotle was designed to combat these subversive opinions [of the 
social contract]” (Gough 1957, p. 13). Justice understood as a contract concerned 
many ancient thinkers because, on this view, justice has a merely instrumental 
value useful for securing individual benefits in social intercourse. If justice is 
valued only because of the benefits it confers, what is to stop citizens from 
deserting justice when its benefits outweigh its costs? Political society can never 
truly be secure on such selfish, individualistic grounds, as many ancient thinkers 
argued. Epicureans, then, insofar as they hold an instrumental conception of 
justice can never be truly trustworthy members of society; they can never be good 
citizens.3 Critics contend that Epicureanism is a counter-cultural and subversive 
political doctrine (Brown 2009, p. 180).  This charge raises the question of how 
an Epicurean can be a reliable member of political society. How is hedonism 
compatible with justice, they wonder. The answer to both of these questions will 
determine whether the Epicurean project of reconciling the pursuit of private 
pleasure with public justice is possible.   
The traditional answer to this question has been that attempting to build 
the bonds of civic allegiance on a foundation of individualistic hedonism is 
hopeless. Commenting on Hobbes’s similar project, David Gauthier notes that 
“from unlimited individualism only anarchy follows” (Gauthier 1969, p. vi).  
While I agree with Gauthier and other critics that the Hobbesian reconciliation 
                                               
3 A similar question arises, for similar reasons, with regard to the Epicureanism and friendship. 
This paper is not directly concerned either with the possibility of Epicurean citizenship or 
friendship, except incidentally in §2. For excellent recent work on the topic of the possibility and 
nature of Epicurean friendship see: (O’Keefe 2001a) and (Evans 2004).   
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project has severe problems, I will argue here that the Epicurean project to 
reconcile private benefit with public stability has promise. If I am right, the 
Epicurean approach to contractual justice will provide a much needed alternative 
to the traditional approaches to contract theory that come from Hobbes and Kant. 
These different features of the Epicurean social contract will then not only interest 
classical scholars, but also contemporary contract theorists who are concerned 
with using the social contract to mediate between private and public reason. To 
that end, I aim to show here that the Epicurean conception of the social contract is 
appealing on its own terms and of interest to contemporary contract theorists.   
To show that justice and pleasure can be reconciled is to show that the 
non-teleological demands of justice are consistent with the teleological dictates of 
hedonistic practical rationality. In §2, I argue that we should think of the 
Epicurean hedonic calculus as applying, at least some of the time, to rules rather 
than directly to actions or desires. Once we understand Epicurean practical 
rationality as a kind of “rule-hedonism,” I argue in §3, it is possible to show that 
contractual justice is consistent with Epicurean practical rationality. Even if the 
social contract is possible, the question remains whether it is necessary. Do 
Epicureans really need a social contract or is first-personal practical rationality 
enough for tranquility? In §4 I argue that even a society of perfectly wise 
Epicureans would need public rules of justice to preform coordinating, assuring, 
and specifying functions. I close by arguing, in §5, that Epicurean 
contractarianism is not only possible and useful, but also attractive.  
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2. Epicurean Practical Rationality  
Showing that Epicurean teleological hedonism is consistent with the non-
teleological demands of justice is the key to the Epicurean reconciliation project. 
Epicurean practical rationality is teleological in that all reasoning aims at the goal 
of ataraxia. The demands of justice are non-teleological in that they are not 
justified on how well they help satisfy some further aim. In this section, I argue 
that we need to understand Epicurean hedonism as applying to rules rather than 
actions or desires for this reconciliation to work. First, I show the general 
contours of Epicurean hedonism. Then I highlight some of the problems that arise 
in relation to friendship, before arguing for a solution to these problems that I call 
“rule-hedonism.” 
Epicurean contractarianism, like all Epicurean thought, is the consequence 
of one fundamental motivational principle: 
 
If you do not, on every occasion, refer each of your actions to the goal of 
nature, but instead turn prematurely to some other [criterion] in avoiding 
or pursuing [things], your actions will not be consistent with your 
reasoning. (KD 25)  
  
This goal of reasoning and action is the absence of pain and the tranquility that 
comes from living without fear (KD 3).4 This kind of pleasure, ataraxia, is 
                                               
4 Throughout I will use the terms “ataraxia” “pleasure” “tranquility” and “happiness” as 
synonyms unless noted otherwise.   
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unhindered tranquility, rather than a sensation of active pleasure. 5  It is a 
psychological fact, according to Epicurus, that we do actually seek ataraxia and 
that our lives go best, from a subjective point of view, when we pursue ataraxia. 
It is the natural goal of beings like us. If fear of the gods, death, and pain 
constitute sickness of the soul, removing those ailments constitutes its health. This 
psychological hedonism creates the justification for the normative hedonism that 
practical reasoning should aim at ataraxia.6 The normative ideal of Epicurean 
practical rationality is a hedonistic form of instrumental rationality with the final 
end of ataraxia. In the parlance of modern decision theory, it is a maximizing 
theory of rationality. Given a set of ordered preferences, individuals chose 
rationally when they choose to act on their highest valued goals. To choose less 
pleasure rather than more pleasure when given the choice is paradigmatically 
irrational and contrary to nature.  
Given this conception of practical rationality and virtue it is hard to see 
how one can single-mindedly pursue pleasure and accept the constraints of 
justice. Traditionally, virtue ethical theories solve this problem by making the 
virtue of justice constitutive of happiness with deontic restraints built into the 
formal conditions of happiness.7 To use the Rawlsian terminology, the right flows 
naturally out of the good. 8  This solution, however, will not work for the 
                                               
5 Here I am following (Nikolsky 2001). 
6 Again, there is some controversy on this point, but I find Nikolsky’s argument persuasive. See: 
(Nikolsky 2001). 
7 For an interesting and sophisticated recent treatment of this problem, see: (LeBar 2009).   
8 Of course, it is easy to overstate this point. Julia Annas cautions against drawing too much of a 
wedge between the ancients and the moderns on this point. See: (Annas 1993, chap. 13). 
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Epicurean. Unlike in Aristotelian or Stoic virtue theory, the standard of Epicurean 
happiness is not an objective, formal standard, but rather the subjective, 
psychological state of ataraxia. The Epicurean has a reason to f only if he or she 
believes that f-ing will reliably lead to the final end of ataraxia. If all reasons are 
instrumental in this sense, how is it possible for the Epicurean to have reason to 
constrain his or her pursuit of the goal of nature by the deontic demands of 
justice? To give a plausible account of justice, the Epicurean needs to explain how 
to justify the demands of justice as a means to the final end of ataraxia.  
One version of this problem arises in the context of friendship. Epicurus 
claims “…every friendship is worth choosing for its own sake, though it takes its 
origin from the benefits it confers on us” (VS 23). Given this statement about the 
value of friendship and KD 25, how can friendship be non-instrumentally valuable 
while also being beneficial because of the benefit it confers? Some have argued 
that genuine friendship is impossible unless we amend the basic egoistic element 
of Epicurean practical rationality.9 In contrast, Matt Evans argues that there are 
two basic approaches to understanding friendship in a consistently egoistic way 
(Evans 2004, 413).  Friendship as “indirect egoism” involves incorporating the 
good of a friend or of friendship generally into one’s own good. This is the 
interpretation that Timothy O’Keefe favors (O’Keefe 2001a).  The alternative is 
Evans’s preferred view, “direct egoism,” that one’s own good “stands or falls” 
with the good of one’s friend (Evans 2004, 413). Indirect egoism is, for O’Keefe, 
a two-level hedonistic theory. Choice of desires is governed directly by hedonic 
concerns and those desires then pick out particular actions, which are only 
                                               
9 See, for instance (Mitsis 1988, 98-128) and (Annas 1993, 236-244). 
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indirectly related to the original hedonic calculus (O’Keefe 2001a, 300-302).  In 
contrast, Evans’s direct egoism applies the hedonic calculus to action selection. 
Evans maintains that Epicureans can “reason their way to friendship” through 
direct egoistic means (Evans 2004, 423). What is true of friendship will likely be 
true of justice so it is imperative to determine whether the Epicurean hedonic 
calculus is meant to apply to actions (direct egoism), desires (indirect egoism), or 
something else entirely. The direct egoism interpretation has the benefit of being 
the easiest to reconcile with KD 25. The indirect egoist interpretation makes it 
easier to understand how the Epicurean can incorporate friendship and justice into 
hedonism. Another possibility, between direct and indirect egoism, is what 
Gregory Kavka calls “rule egoism” (Kavka 1986, chap. 9).  Although Kavka 
developed his version of rule egoism in the context of understanding Hobbes’s 
ethical theory, there are enough similarities between the two accounts for a 
plausible Epicurean version as well. The hedonic calculus applies directly to rules 
rather than to desires or action. Furthermore, rules can be generalizations over 
desires or actions, e.g. “don’t cultivate a desire for riches” or “seek out friends.” 
The first is a rule that indicates what desires will lead to pleasure whereas the 
second is a rule that indicates a particular set of actions that will likely lead to 
pleasure, namely having friends.  
Rule egoism has several benefits over direct and indirect egoism. First, it 
is more general. Both actions and desires are mentioned throughout KD and VS as 
the possible object of choice. Rule egoism recognizes the importance of both 
actions and desires to the end of ataraxia and accounts for both in terms of rules. 
Second, rule egoism is simpler and likely more reliable than direct or indirect 
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egoism. It is reasonable to expect that the typical Epicurean would be bewildered 
in the face of the multiplicity and complexity of choices that would face him or 
her on any given day. The stress of deliberating over actions on the direct egoist 
interpretation of KD 25 would often create anxiety rather than tranquility. 
Similarly, it is not clear that, given the complexity of the world, the direct 
approach would reliably lead to ataraxia. The indirect approach is not better on 
this count partly because desires do not necessarily pick out unique action in 
decision situations, partly because the indirect egoist faces the same problem as 
the direct egoist at the level of desires. By using rules, however, the Epicurean 
can rely on the knowledge embodied in the rules without having to deliberate in 
each case.   
This explains the reason that Epicurus spends so much time in his writing 
listing rules and maxims. He gives rules about how to reduce sexual passion (VS 
18), the irrationality of suicide (VS 38), the danger of envy (VS 53), and the 
dangers of great wealth (VS 67). In all of these cases, and many more, Epicurus is 
passing on wisdom about how to reliably achieve ataraxia. He is playing the part, 
as it were, of a guide who has walked down life’s tangled road and is reporting to 
those who have yet to see everything he has seen. These maxims or rules are the 
embodiment of the successful use of practical rationality in the past. Following 
these types of rules is, therefore, an application of direct egoism in an indirect 
way. Given the limited cognitive capacity and time of the Epicurean rational 
agent, relying on rules as a guide can be, following Gigerenzer and Goldstein, a 
“fast and frugal” way of reasoning based on heuristics communicated as rules or 
maxims (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996). Instead of choosing over the expected 
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outcome of individual acts, the rule egoist chooses sets of rules to follow based on 
the expected outcome of following that rule or set of rules (Kavka 1986, 358-
359). In the next section we will see how understanding Epicurean practical 
rationality as “rule-hedonism” makes it possible to reconcile Epicurean practical 
rationality with justice.  
    
3. The Possibility of the Contract 
Once we understand Epicurean practical rationality as applying to rules rather 
than to particular actions or desires, we can see how the Epicurean can reconcile 
the imperatives of practical rationality with the demands of justice. A particular 
social contract is a set of rules that regulates behavior in certain public settings. 
The Epicurean agrees to a particular set of rules in order to more reliably achieve 
and maintain personal ataraxia. We might wonder, however, why the Epicurean 
would need a contract at all. Why wouldn’t the first-personal application of 
practical rationality be sufficient for ataraxia? Why is the social contract 
necessary? In a world of practically rational Epicureans, the social contract seems 
either otiose or harmful. Either the contract recommends what practical rationality 
would recommend or it conflicts with practical rationality. On its face, Epicurean 
contractarianism looks either unnecessary or impossible. I will argue here that the 
Epicurean social contract is both necessary and possible. The social contract is 
necessary, as I will argue in the next section, for its coordinating, assuring, and 
specifying functions. The social contract is possible because of the role that rules 
can play in Epicurean practical rationality. In this section I will argue that the 
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Epicurean social contract is consistent with Epicurean practical rationality and, 
hence, possible, while fulfilling an important social role.  
The Epicurean social contract is fundamentally instrumental; it is a 
“pledge of reciprocal usefulness neither to harm one another nor be harmed” (KD 
35). To be consistent with Epicurean practical rationality, then, the contract must 
secure benefits that would not be possible without the contract. If, however, one 
only has reason to enter into a contract because of the benefits, what reason does 
one have to follow the contract when there are no benefits and only costs? This is 
the heart of the concern that the Epicurean cannot be a good citizen. If citizenship 
involves the possibility of sacrifice, why should we expect the Epicurean to 
comply? Here again, we see the same kind of problem that we saw in §2 
concerning friendship; the solution is also similar.   
A conflict between practical rationality and the requirements of justice 
arises when the connection between the rules of justice and individual benefit 
come apart. If someone is convinced that he or she will be able to avoid detection, 
there is no reason, one might fear, not to commit injustice. When benefit and 
justice conflict, so much the worse for justice. To solve this problem, we need to 
show that the rules of justice are an integral part of practical rationality and so 
rules of justice will not conflict with practical rationality, rightly understood.  
To see how this integration is possible consider a case from Book II of De 
Finibus. 10  Cicero’s challenges Torquatus with two situations where acts of 
injustice lead to substantial benefits. In one case, a man leaves his estate to his 
                                               
10 All references to De Finibus are from the 2001 edition edited by Julia Annas and translated by 
Raphael Woolf. See: (Cicero 2001). 
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friend in trust for his daughter. Once the man is dead, his friend lacks a prudential 
reason for keeping his word to hold the estate in trust (De Fin, II 58). In a second 
case, Cicero supposes an Epicurean knows “…that a viper is lurking somewhere, 
and that someone whose death would benefit you is about to sit down on it 
unawares” (De Fin, II 59). If no one is around, it is hard to see why the Epicurean 
would warn the person about the snake. The question is whether the Epicurean, in 
cases like these, will be reliably just. 
Torquatus argues that the Epicurean would naturally feel guilty after doing 
wrong and, hence, would avoid doing it in the first place. Knowing their own 
psychological make-up, the Epicurean will avoid acting unjustly so as to avoid the 
guilt, remorse, stress, and other negative emotions that come from hurting others 
and acting unjustly. Cicero, unconvinced, replies that when dealing with a “sly 
fox” without remorse, this response will be impotent. The Epicurean, according to 
Cicero, is begging the question by claiming that there will never be any 
temptation to behave improperly in the first place. In effect, the Epicurean is 
denying that benefit and justice can ever conflict. Similarly, the Epicurean might 
also reply, as Torquatus does in Book I that, “however secret the deed, there is 
never a guarantee that it will remain secret” (De Fin, I 50). This is also 
presumably true, but it seems to miss something important in the Ciceronian 
challenge. Cicero, like Glaucon is arguing that there are at least some cases where 
benefit and justice will recommend different actions, since Epicurean practical 
rationality is based on benefit, to act justly in cases where justice conflicts with 
benefit is to act irrationally.     
13 
 The Epicurean, however, can respond to these concerns once we 
understand the role of rules in Epicurean practical rationality. We saw in §2 that 
rule following is often more reliable than individual action evaluation in 
achieving pleasure. Rules constrain the teleological pursuit of the good, but only 
as a means of more reliably achieving more good. The Epicurean is trying to 
optimize on ataraxia given the constraints of justice, just as a rational economizer 
in the market will try to optimize on value given the hard budget constraints they 
may have.11 In the same way that a budget constraint for a household will rule out 
some valuable purchases, over time it will ensure the solvency of the household. 
Justice, to the rational Epicurean, is similar; it restricts individual choices in the 
short-run, but increases the reliability of achieving pleasure in the long-run.  
Justice constrains action at the local level as a means to global optimizing of 
ataraxia. Rules play this role in the Epicurean conception of justice by specifying 
publicly stable and recognized action directives. 
Following the contractual rules of justice is also a prudent strategy for 
those, like the Epicurean, who are primarily concerned with tranquility. Epicurus 
writes that, “the just life is most free from disturbance, but the unjust life is full of 
the greatest disturbance” (KD 17). Epicurus is arguing that following the rules of 
justice is a key component of the tranquil life. No one who disobeys the rules of 
justice can be certain that they will be able to avoid detection from their 
wrongdoing. This uncertainty causes anxiety. Anxiety is the opposite of 
                                               
11 The obvious analogy is to linear programming and maximization given constraint, where the 
constraint here is the contractarian rules of justice. For an example how constraints are applied to 
practical rationality that is similar to the account offered here, see: (Schmidtz 1992).  
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tranquility. This is much the same response that Hume gives to the sensible knave 
when he admits that someone who is not disposed to follow the rules of justice 
cannot be easily convinced of their worth, but that those who are disposed to act 
justly open themselves to “…inward peace of mind” (EPM, 9.22).12 The wise 
Epicurean will not gamble on the probability of getting away with injustice in 
each act but will follow the rules of justice instead. Wisdom is the unwillingness 
to gamble in these situations.  
Once we see that justice can be part of a means to the end of globally 
optimizing on ataraxia, it is worth taking another look at earlier challenges raised 
by Glaucon and Cicero. The Lydian shepherd, with the Ring of Gyges, has the 
ability to commit any crime without fear of reprisal. This power to commit 
injustice without the fear of reprisal makes the shepherd “an equal to a god among 
humans” (Republic, 360c).13Glaucon wants Socrates to demonstrate that even the 
Lydian shepherd has reason to be just, but Glaucon is surely asking for the 
impossible. As both Epicurus and Hume suggest, there can be no justice between 
gods and mortals or humans and animals (KD 32). Justice is a relationship 
between relative equals (EPM, 3.18-21). Hume suggests that if there were a 
species so weak that they could never hope to harm us, we would not be able to 
treat them justly (EPM, 3.18). Once the shepherd has the Ring, he is no longer in 
                                               
12 EPM is an abbreviation for The Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. All citations are 
from the 1998 edition edited by Tom Beauchamp, see: (Hume 1998). 
13 All references to The Republic are from Bloom’s 1968 translation. See: (Plato 1968). 
15 
the circumstances of justice with his fellows. 14 In these types of cases, the rules of 
justice do not reliably lead to ataraxia. The Epicurean realizes, however, that the 
actual world has a conspicuous lack of all-powerful magical rings. We do exist, 
for the most part, in the circumstances of justice and, hence, the rules of justice do 
tend to be reliable tools. Our fellows are roughly as powerful and frail as we are. 
As David Gauthier puts it, “human beings live, and must live, in the 
circumstances of justice” (Gauthier 1982, p. 27).  Hobbes was right to think that 
however unequal humans may be in many respects, we are still roughly equal in 
the ability to harm one another (Leviathan, chap. 15).15 This means that whatever 
incidental asymmetries of power and resources that may arise, the circumstances 
of justice will remain. 
In our world of approximate equality, Epicureans will have prudential 
reason to abide by the rules of justice as a means to ataraxia. The pursuit of the 
good is rationally constrained by principles of right so that one may more reliably 
achieve tranquility.16 By making the rules of justice an essential component of the 
                                               
14 Epicurus is unequivocal that justice is useful and that the purpose of justice is mutual, reciprocal 
benefit (KD 31). 
15 References from Leviathan are from the 1996 Cambridge Revised Student Edition edited by 
Richard Tuck. See: (Hobbes 1996) 
16 There are obvious similarities between my account and the account in (Vander Waerdt 1987, 
p.408-411).  One main difference, though, is that I am dealing with the question of whether it 
rational to follow the rules of justice in the normal, everyday case. That is, whether it can ever be 
rational to abide by the rules of justice when they conflict with what practical rationality would 
recommend if the case were judged on its own, without relation to the rules. Vander Waerdt is 
concerned primarily with the question of whether there are cases where the Epicurean will be 
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prudent pursuit of ataraxia, we can see how it is possible for an Epicurean to be 
both practically rational and committed to the rules of justice. As a modern 
proponent of a kind of view argued, “duty overrides advantage, but the acceptance 
of duty is truly advantageous” (Gauthier 1986, p. 2). Naturally, this is only true if 
the rules of justice really do reliably lead to security and tranquility. The act of 
merely contracting, however, is not enough to ensure this. As Eric Brown notes, 
“Epicurus recognizes limitations on the substance of the convention,” namely that 
the rules of justice actually do guarantee reciprocal usefulness and protection 
from harm (Brown 2009, p. 195). Brown also notes that the efficacy of the rules 
of justice will lead to different rules being acceptable in different times and 
places. Epicurus can provide a justificatory test of the rules of justice, that they 
are reciprocally useful and provide protection, but he cannot specify exact rules of 
justice that will be stable across different societies and different ages. This is how 
it should be. One of the key lessons we learn from modern, evolutionary minded 
theorists of justice is that effective social norms and rules will vary depending on 
the circumstances of the time and place. 17  Once we see that Epicurean 
contractarianism can be consistent with Epicurean practical rationality, that is, 
once we see that justice can be instrumentally valuable to the pursuit of ataraxia, 
the individual Epicurean will have a self-interested reason to obey the constraints 
of justice. The Epicurean social contract, then, is possible. The question remains, 
                                                                                                                                
required by practical rationality to disobey the rules of justice. Some of the replies here to Cicero 
and Glaucon will apply to this question, though a full response would require more work.  
17 For a sophisticated recent attempt to deal with this problem, see: (Vanderschraaf 2010).  
Epicurus also makes this point in KD 36. 
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however, why Epicureans need a social contract. If justice is consistent with 
practical rationality, first-personal practical rationality should be enough. To see 
why the Epicurean social contract is both possible and necessary we need to look 
at the specifically social role that the contract plays in coordinating and assuring 
members of society.  
4. The Necessity of the Contract 
The question of this section is why justice must be the result of a social compact 
and not merely part of the successful application of first-personal practical 
rationality, why justice, for the Epicurean, must be social rather than a merely 
personal virtue. I will argue that the social contract is necessary for three reasons: 
1) it coordinate actions between members of a society 2) it helps create assurance 
that everyone in the society will follow the rules of justice 3) it specifies those 
rules to avoid ambiguity. These are the coordination, assurance, and specification 
functions of the social contract, respectively. None of these social functions can 
be accomplished by the separate, individual use of practical rationality.  
The problem that the Epicurean social contract solves is not the same 
problem that the Hobbesian contract seeks to solve. The problem in Hobbes’s 
state of nature is that natural equality leads to everyone believing that they can 
trample over others to achieve their ends (Leviathan, chap. 13). They overestimate 
their strengths as well as the benefits of conflict, while underestimating their 
weaknesses as well as the costs of conflict. Strife is the norm. The Epicurean 
contractor is not motivated by a desire to overpower or avoid others, but rather is 
driven by a desire to seek the means of mutual accommodation to avoid conflict 
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in order to live blessedly. As we saw in §2 and §3, the Epicurean sees the rules of 
justice as a reliable way to secure tranquility. The rational Epicurean, however, 
will recognize that even if the social world is not necessarily characterized by 
strife in the way that Hobbes thinks, it is still characterized by confusion and 
misunderstanding. People would rather cooperate than fight, but if they are 
unsure, what others will do or unsure what the rules are, they will be afraid to 
cooperate. Furthermore, when disputes arise, there needs to be an impartial means 
to resolve disputes. Otherwise, the gains that might have come from cooperating 
and living with others, the benefits of commerce as well as friendship, will be 
lost. 
 Understood this way, we should model the Epicurean social contract as an 
assurance game. This type of strategic interaction models a social condition 
whereby individuals would most like to be able to coordinate and cooperate but 
are unsure how to do so and whether others will also cooperate. In contrast, the 
Hobbesian state of nature is a “mixed-motive game” like a prisoner’s dilemma. In 
a mixed motive game, everyone will benefit from cooperation, but each person 
will also be tempted to defect from cooperation, universal defection, therefore, 
will be the dominant strategy.18  One version of a mixed-motive game, the 
prisoner’s dilemma, is represented in Table 1 below with Roman numerals 
representing each prisoner’s preference ranking (I is preferred to II and so on): 
Table 1 
 Prisoner 2 
Not Confess Confess 
                                               
18 For a canonical description of the prisoner’s dilemma see: (Luce and Raiffa 1957, §5.4). 
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Prisoner 1 
Not Confess II, II IV, I 
Confess I, IV III, III 
 
In a two-person prisoner’s dilemma, both prisoners are better off if they cooperate 
and do not confess. This solution is not stable, however. Each is better if they 
confess while the other stays silent. If they both reason this way, as they will if 
they are rational, they will be both led to the {confess, confess} equilibrium, 
which is stable. The moral of the mixed-motive game is a tragic one. In this case, 
the exercise of individual practical rationality leads to an outcome that either party 
would have preferred to avoid. The only way to make cooperation rational in a 
prisoner’s dilemma is to transform each player’s payoffs in the game and thereby 
to transform the prisoner’s dilemma into some other game where cooperation can 
be rational.19 The only way to win in a prisoner’s dilemma, in short, is not to play 
at all. The question becomes, then, how to transform mixed-motive games where 
cooperation is difficult or impossible into coordination games where cooperation 
is possible and beneficial. The Epicurean social contract makes cooperation 
between practically rational agents possible and stable by transforming mixed-
motive games into coordination games. To see how this process works, though, 
we need have a basic understanding of assurance games.20 
                                               
19 This is a point that informs much of Cristina Bicchieri’s recent work on social norms. See: 
(Bicchieri 2006, chap. 1). 
20 An assurance game is a kind of impure coordination game. On the assurance problem, see: (Sen 
1967) and (Baier 1995, chap. 5).   
20 
Unlike mixed-motive games, assurance games typically involve multiple 
equilibria. In some cases, one equilibria is more beneficial (payoff-dominant), 
while the other is less risky (risk-dominant).  The classic example is the stag hunt. 
In a stag hunt, players can chose to either hunt hare or stag. If both decide to hunt 
stag, they both benefit the most. If one decides to hunt stag and the other decides 
to hunt hare, the hare hunter gains and the stag hunter gets nothing because it 
takes two people to effectively hunt stag. One version of this game is represented 
below in Table 2 again with ordinal pay-offs represented by Roman numerals:  
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
 
Hunter A 
Hunt Stag Hunt Hare 
Hunter B 
Hunt Stag I, I III, II 
Hunt Hare II, III II, II 
 
The game has two pure equilibria (in bold): both hunt stag and both hunt hare. 
The problem is that the players will only hunt stag only if they trust that the other 
player will hunt stag, otherwise they will hunt hare. The problem that the 
Epicurean social contract solves is a stag hunt not a prisoner’s dilemma. On this 
point I agree with Mitsis (Mitsis 1988, p. 81-82) that Denyer and Bailey are 
mistaken when they model the Epicurean contract as a solution to a prisoner’s 
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dilemma (Denyer 1983; Bailey 1928).  I have already shown why this is the case 
in §2 and §3. Epicureans see effective rules of justice as a reliable means to 
ataraxia. A world where the Epicurean can be secure in the knowledge that they 
neither will harm nor be harmed by others is the most tranquil and prosperous 
kind of world (KD 33).  
We are now in a position to see why the social contract is necessary to 
ensure mutual safety and cooperation. If the state of nature is a stag hunt, the 
problem is how to move from the risk-dominant equilibrium {hare, hare} to the 
payoff-dominant equilibrium {stag, stag} (Skyrms 2004, p. 9-13). Unless there is 
assurance that everyone else will hunt stag, each player will take the less risky 
strategy and hunt hare. If everyone hunts hare, however, society will be worse off 
than it might have been. The key to solving this problem is to develop a means to 
reliably indicate that everyone is planning to hunt stag rather than hare. As many 
recent thinkers have suggested in their different ways, the social contract 
understood as a set of norms or rules can be mechanisms for creating the public, 
social assurance that is necessary for mutual cooperation (Skyrms 2004; Bicchieri 
2006; Binmore 2005; Smith 2008; Gintis 2009; Gaus 2011). These rules and 
norms make social coordination possible by facilitating mutual gain from 
cooperation. The mere presence of a suitably enforced contract can create the 
conditions that allow for justice and mutual benefit.21 Epicurean contractors can 
                                               
21 Herbert Gintis gives a different, though similar method of using social norms to solve mixed-
motive and coordination games that involves transforming the original game into a super-game 
with another player, the choreographer who makes a move before all of the other players. See: 
(Gintis 2010).  
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help to solve the mutual assurance problem by making clear, reasonable rules of 
justice that both Epicureans and non-Epicureans will have reason to follow 
because of the benefits that these rules secure. By contracting with one and other, 
Epicureans can make it possible for non-Epicureans to join the contract by fixing 
norms, making a public commitment to mutual assurance. There is still, however, 
an important role for punishment to play in stabilizing the social contract. While 
non-Epicureans will, no doubt, see the benefits of cooperating with the 
Epicureans along contractual lines, given the imperfections in their practical 
reasoning, they will still likely be tempted to cheat and disobey the rules of justice 
when they can get away with it. Punishment can help deter non-Epicureans from 
breaking the rules by increasing the cost and decreasing the benefit of cheating. 
Epicurus makes this point himself in KD 34. Punishment can stabilize the social 
contract and preserve cooperation (Boyd and Richerson 2005).  
A suitably enforced set of rules is not only necessary to prevent cheating 
by non-Epicureans, however. Consider, for instance, the case of a society made up 
of wise Epicureans.22 Even in that kind of society, the social contract would be 
necessary.23 Epistemic and factual differences will lead each person to pursue 
different goals in different ways. Their conceptions of how to attain ataraxia as a 
                                               
22For more on the important coordinating function of justice in Epicurean contractarianism which 
parallels many of the arguments made here in a different way, see: (O’Keefe 2001b). 
23 My discussion on this point shares some similarities with a theme of Gregory Kavka’s work. 
The general idea that he and I both share is that, in his words, “…interpersonal conflicts…are 
not—as is often thought—simply a result of the immorality of the parties involved. Rather, they 
are at least partly the result of independent parties pursuing morally legitimate aims in a situation 
whose structure leads them into conflict” (Kavka 1995, p. 18).  
23 
practical matter will not be identical. Even when two parties have the same 
motivation or the same ends, to coordinate each party needs to believe that the 
other party will actually do their part when their time comes (Skyrms 2001, p. 32-
33). One way to create this belief is to explicitly contract and to create 
enforcement mechanism that ensure everyone will do his or her duty. This is 
essentially the Hobbesian solution, to use punishment to secure compliance. The 
problem with this, from the Epicurean point of view, is that a sovereign powerful 
enough to protect and enforce compliance through punishment is also powerful 
enough to oppress. In addition to the previous problems of coordination, 
assurance, and specification, this solution creates the new problem of how to 
ensure protection from the sovereign. The main reason that Hobbes needs such a 
strong sovereign is that the Hobbesian state of nature is a prisoner’s dilemma. As 
I have argued, however, that is not the situation in the world as conceived by the 
Epicureans. The problem that the social contract solves, for the Epicurean, is an 
assurance problem, not a mixed-motive problem. The role of the social contract 
then is to facilitate coordination and cooperation by specifying the rules of justice 
in a way that can lead to mutual assurance.  
We get a picture of how the creation of an Epicurean social contract 
consisting of social rules and norms could arise in Lucretius’s description of the 
evolution of the social contract In Book V of De Rerum Natura.24 There, Lucretius 
describes a natural state where, “each had to fight against all in an endless 
struggle for food, water, and minimal comfort” (DRN, V.839-840) and in the 
                                               
24 All excerpts from Lucretius taken from the 2008 Slavitt translation of De Rerum Natura, see: 
(Lucretius 2008). 
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night men and beasts would prey upon one another while the weak cowered in 
fear.25 This is the mixed-motive nightmare of the Hobbesian state of nature. 
Eventually, though, men and women devise lodgings and begin to marry (DRN, 
V.878-885). Families band together to hunt more effectively and to protect their 
women and children while they are hunting (DRN, V.889-900). At this point, we 
can already see the basis of the transformation from the mixed-motive situation to 
a state of nature where assurance is the primary problem. It is the desire for 
companionship and family as well as the benefits of social hunting that transforms 
the mixed-motive problem into an assurance problem. Unlike the Hobbesian state 
of nature, which is full of fear and envy, this state of nature is characterized by the 
Epicurean desire for friendship and mutual benefit. 
Once we understand the problem that the social contract solves as an 
assurance problem rather than a mixed-motive problem, we can clearly see why 
the Epicurean social contract is necessary. It is necessary because it fulfills the 
coordinating, assuring, and specification functions important to creating a stable 
general commitment to coordinate on the pay-off dominant rather than the risk-
dominant equilibrium. Only a public, social contract can preform this function. 
The individual use of practical rationality would not be able to fulfill these 
coordinating, assuring, and specifying functions.     
5. Epicurean Contractarianism  
Like many modern contractarians who followed him, Epicurus recognized that 
justice is necessary and desirable because of the benefits it brings and for no other 
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reason. The social contract is the embodiment of justice as mutual benefit. The 
question for the Epicurean, the question that we began with, is whether the 
conception of justice as mutual benefit is compatible with Epicurean hedonism. Is 
it possible to reconcile justice and pleasure? 
 I have argued that the social contract is the means of reconciling justice 
and pleasure. For this to be a plausible strategy, however, required answering 
three basic questions. First, how is it possible for the Epicurean practical 
rationality to be governed by the rules in general? Second, if the first question was 
answered, how is the social contract possible given that justice may require 
individuals to sacrifice some pleasure in order to maintain the rules of justice? 
Third, even if the social contract is possible, why is it necessary from an 
Epicurean point of view? I answered the first question in §2 by arguing that 
Epicurean practical rationality is a form of “rule hedonism.” Epicureans apply the 
hedonic calculus, at least some of the time, to rules rather than to actions or 
desires. Once we recognize that Epicureans are rule followers, it is a simple next 
step to show that it is possible for them to follow rules of justice, even when 
individual applications of those rules might be costly. In §3, I argued that 
Epicurean practical rationality, understood as rule-hedonism, is consistent with 
the demands of justice and that Epicureans can be reliably expected to abide by 
the demands of justice. Even if it is possible for Epicureans to follow the rules of 
justice, it is still an open question of whether those rules are actually necessary. 
That is, does the social contract fulfill an important function that the individual 
use of practical rationality cannot fulfill? In §4, I argued that a social contract is 
necessary because of the coordinating, assuring, and specifying role that it plays.   
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 Once we see that the Epicurean social contract is both possible and 
necessary, given the starting point of Epicurean practical rationality, we are left 
with the further question of whether this particular reconciliation of justice and 
pleasure is appealing. I will conclude with this question. The ultimate motivation 
for Epicurean contractarian is knowledge that life is fleeting. As Epicurus writes, 
“We are born only once, and we cannot be born twice; and one must for all 
eternity exist no more. You are not in control of tomorrow and yet you delay your 
opportunity to rejoice” (VS 14). Too much of history is the chronicle of lives 
destroyed and wasted in pursuits that enriched one life at the expense of another. 
The Epicurean vision of the just and good society is one where people are secure 
to freely pursue the ends they find valuable and to enjoy what little of life one has 
left without pain and fear and in the company of friends. The business of justice is 
to allow us to get on with the, all too short, business of living. As Hume wrote in 
his essay “The Epicurean” the motivating idea of this approach are the recognition 
of the frailty and the ephemeral nature of our own existence.  Hume writes: 
 
if life be frail, if youth be transitory, we should well employ the present 
moment, and lose no part of so perishable an existence. Yet a little 
moment and these shall be no more. We shall be, as if we had never been. 
Not a memory of us be left upon earth; and even the fabulous shades 
below will not afford us a habitation. Our fruitless anxieties, our vain 
projects, our uncertain speculations shall all be swallowed up and lost. Our 
present doubts, concerning the original cause of all things, must never, 
alas! be resolved. This alone we may be certain of, that, if any governing 
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mind preside, he must be pleased to see us fulfill the ends of our being, 
and enjoy that pleasure, for which alone we were created. (Hume 
1985/1742, Essay XV "The Epicurean") 
 
Epicurean justice is an attempt to give an account of the rules that govern our 
interaction so that we may “enjoy that pleasure, for which we are alone created.” 
If one finds this conception of the good society and the good life compelling, one 
will also find this kind of contractarian approach to justice appealing. Regardless, 
the real value and novelty of his theory is that he took the need to justify 
constraints on the individual pursuit of the good seriously. It is for that reason that 
his theory is still worthy of serious study.   
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